PEMBATASAN DAN PENGUATAN KEKUASAAN KEHAKIMAN DALAM PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG

Giri Ahmad Taufik

Abstract


ABSTRAK
Kekuasaan kehakiman (yudikatif) merupakan cabang kekuasaan pemerintahan terlemah dibanding kekuasaan pemerintahan lainnya yaitu eksekutif dan legislatif. Kekuasaan riil dari kekuasaan kehakiman hanya terletak pada kewibawaan pengadilan sebagai sebuah institusi. Salah satu yang dapat mewujudkan kewibawaan kekuasaan kehakiman adalah aktor pelaksana kekuasaan tersebut yaitu hakim yang memiliki kompetensi tinggi dan baik. Hubungan kausalitas antara kedua faktor tersebut membuat banyak pakar menyatakan keterkaitan yang kuat antara proses rekrutmen hakim terhadap masa depan kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman, terlebih lagi pada proses rekrutmen hakim agung di Mahkamah Agung. Proses rekrutmen hakim agung harus terjaga dari intervensi kepentingan politik. Hal ini merupakan rasio dari Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 27/PUU-XI/2013. Putusan tersebut telah mendudukkan peran DPR di pelaksanaan rekrutmen hakim agung dalam posisi yang pasif, untuk menghindari intrusi kepentingan politik. Hal tersebut  dimaksudkan untuk memberikan perlindungan kepada kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman secara keseluruhan. Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi ini maka diperlukan perubahan Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung dan Undang-Undang Komisi Yudisial untuk mengakomodir prinsip kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman utamanya dalam proses rekrutmen hakim agung sebagaimana terkandung di dalam UUD NRI 1945.

Kata kunci: rekrutmen hakim agung, kekuasaan kehakiman, kepentingan politik.


ABSTRACT
Judicial power is the weakest power compared to the executive and legislative power. The actual supremacy of the judicial power lies merely on the authority of the court as an institution. This has caused the judicial honor and dignity is determined by the apparatus executing the judicial power, which is none other than the adept and qualified judges. The causality relationship makes many experts consider that there is a strong link between the process of recruitment of judges with the future independence of the judiciary, especially in the process of recruitment of supreme court judges. The process of recruitment of the supreme court judge must be kept from the intervention of political interests. This is the rationale of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 27/PUU-XI/2013. The decision has put the House of Representatives in the process of recruitment of the supreme court judge in passive position, to avoid the intrusion of political interests. It is intended to provide full protection to the judicial independence. Post-issuance of this decision it is considered necessary to amend the Law on Supreme Court and the Law on Judicial Commission primarily to accommodate the principle of judicial independence in the process of
recruitment of the supreme court judges as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Keywords: recruitment of supreme court judges, judicial power, political interest.

Keywords


recruitment of supreme court judges; judicial power; political interest

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.29123/jy.v7i3.81

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